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Abstract  
Recent studies have shown that party systems in emerging democracies do not 
always adequately reflect the various cleavages of society. Under such 
circumstances, retrospective voting may play a more important role than cleavage 
voting in determining electoral outcomes. For studies of retrospective voting, the 
choice between macro and micro level as the independent variable is a major 
methodological issue. Using individual-level data on Turkey, this paper addresses 
two major questions: (1) Are voters’ decisions based on household economic 
conditions or national economic conditions? Do sociopolitical conditions also count? 
(2) Does the future evaluation of the economy affect voting decisions apart from past 
evaluation? Logit models are used in this research to answer these questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent studies have shown that party systems in emerging democracies do not always 
adequately reflect the various cleavages of society. 1  Under such circumstances, 
retrospective voting may play a more important role than cleavage voting in 
determining electoral outcomes. The retrospective voting model assumes that 
individuals make a voting decision based on previous socioeconomic gains or losses 
that have occurred under the incumbent.2 Despite its potential importance, retrospective 
voting has scarcely been investigated in Turkey, especially on the individual level.3 
This paper provides preliminary findings that will serve to minimize this gap in research 
by analyzing survey data collected by Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar 
Vakfı-TÜSES and Veri Araştırma in April 2002. 
For single-country studies of retrospective voting, the choice between macro and 
micro level as the independent variable is a major methodological issue. Some scholars 
have argued that gains and losses are perceived not in terms of individuals, but rather in 
terms of the community or nation to which they belong. Analyzing individual opinion 
poll data, Ron Johnston and others have proposed explanations for changing geographic 
patterns of voting in Britain from the late 1970’s to the 1980’s.4 They found that 
widening geographical gaps in voting behavior were associated with growing variance 
in socioeconomic geography. In relatively affluent (or deprived) regions, people tended 
to vote for (or against) the party in power when they approved (or disapproved) of the 
outcome of its policy in the region. Steven Reed and Gregory Brunk’s time-series 
analysis of Japanese parliamentary elections supported the macro-criteria hypothesis.5 
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In contrast, Ian McAllister and Donley Studlar,6 using individual opinion poll and 
survey data, showed that once the socioeconomic status of a constituency was 
controlled, effects of the constituency environment on voting behavior became 
insignificant. Their results indicated that for a person with a particular socioeconomic 
status, the probability of voting for the Conservatives would not change if he or she 
moved to a constituency characterized by higher or lower socioeconomic status.7 
Malcolm Brynin and David Sanders showed that voters who felt that they were in good 
health were more likely to vote for the incumbent than for the opposition.8  
It would seem possible, however, to incorporate both personal and collective aspects 
of gains and losses in the analysis of a specific country. Gregory Markus has argued that 
in elections, voters take into consideration both their personal economic predicament 
and the nation’s economic condition. His analysis of pooled individual-level survey data 
from eight U. S. presidential election years provided support for his hypothesis.9 This 
paper shares Markus’ view and adopts both macro and micro perspectives on 
retrospective voting. The data used for this paper is particularly suitable for 
investigating this issue. In February 2001, Turkey experienced an economic crisis 
triggered by a financial crisis and a flight of short-term capital (hot money). Massive 
currency devaluation (40 percent on 23 February),10 hit an economy that for 2001, 
recorded the lowest per capita GDP growth rate following the Second World War 
(negative 9.3 percent). In the general election of November 2002, the three incumbent 
parties suffered serious defeats, receiving only 14.7 percent of the vote. The data 
collected in April 2002 thus reveals typical processes through which voters punish 
incumbents.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Using individual-level data, this paper addresses two major questions: (1) Are voters’ 
decisions based on household economic conditions or national economic conditions? 
Do sociopolitical conditions also count? (2) Does the future evaluation of the economy 
affect voting decisions apart from past evaluation? A logit model is used in this research 
to answer these questions.  
The binary dependent variable is the voter’s support (one) or nonsupport (zero) for 
the incumbent. The independent variables include voter evaluation measured using an 
ordinal scale ranging from one to five (but treated as continuous in the logit model) of: 
(1) the household economy in the last twelve months and in the next twelve months, (2) 
the national economy in the last twelve months and in the next twelve months, and (3) 
society and politics in the last twelve months and in the next twelve months. The logit 
model predicts whether or not changes in the independent variable(s) significantly affect 
the probabilities of the binary dependent variable taking a value of one (in this case, 
support for the incumbent) instead of a value of zero. The effect of each independent 
variable is measured by the odds ratio in which unit change in the independent variable 
multiplies the odds of occurrence against non-occurrence.11 
TÜSES and Veri Araştırma jointly conducted the opinion survey, and they kindly 
made individual survey data available to the author for research reported here. The 
survey was conducted across the country in April 2002 using a structured sample of 
1,807. The data set included several questions and answers directly related to 
retrospective voting. For example, voters were asked what party they supported in the 
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previous general election, the party that they intended to vote for if general elections 
were held on the day they were interviewed, what their evaluation of the national 
economy was, and the evaluation of their household economy in the last twelve and in 
the coming twelve months. The data set also included voter evaluations of society and 
politics in the last twelve months and in the future. The resulting publication focused on 
the profile of party supporters in Turkey,12 and it did not address the question of 
retrospective voting. It is thus worthwhile to use the survey data to explore relationships 
that have not yet been researched. 
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
 
Summary statistics of the survey data are shown in Table 1. There are two major 
features of this data: First, public intolerance of the incumbent was very high. When 
asked which party they would vote for if there were general elections on that day, only 
15.8 percent (n=215) of valid respondents13 (n=1,359) chose to vote for any of the 
incumbent parties. The data from TÜSES-Veri Araştırma thus suggested severe electoral 
punishment of the governing parties in the coming general election, and in fact, the 
three incumbent parties together received only 14.7 percent of total valid votes in the 
general election of November 2002.  
Second, voter evaluation of the economy and society in the recent past was generally 
very low. In the sample, 85.1 percent responded that their household economy had 
become either worse or much worse in the last twelve months, 91.3 percent indicated 
that the national economy had become worse or much worse, and 90.2 percent 
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evaluated society-politics in the same negative fashion. These very low evaluations, 
especially for the last twelve months, can be explained by the above-mentioned 
economic crisis in 2001. For the near future, more than half of the respondents thought 
that the household economy, the national economy, and society-politics would still be 
either much worse or worse. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Survey Data (N=1,807) 
Dependent  
Variable 
 0:   
Noa 
 1:  
Yes 
 Missing: 
Don't 
Knowb 
Total 
Support for  
the Incumbent 
 1,144  215  448 1807 
  (63.3)  (11.9)  (24.8) (100.0)
Independent  
Variable  
1:  
Much 
Worse 
2:  
Worse 
3:  
No 
Change
4:  
Better 
5:  
Much 
Better 
Missing: 
Don't 
Know 
Total 
Household  
economy 
   
  Past 508 1030 211 52 6 0 1807
 (28.1) (57.0) (11.7) (2.9) (0.3) (0.0) (100.0)
  Future 286 720 511 248 12 30 1807
 (15.8) (39.8) (28.3) (13.7) (0.7) (1.7) (100.0)
National  
Economy 
   
  Past 651 999 87 53 14 3 1807
 (36.0) (55.3) (4.8) (2.9) (0.8) (0.2) (100.0)
  Future 375 737 389 261 19 26 1807
 (20.8) (40.8) (21.5) (14.4) (1.1) (1.4) (100.0)
Society-Politics    
  Past 644 986 105 52 13 7 1807
 (35.6) (54.6) (5.8) (2.9) (0.7) (0.4) (100.0)
  Future 388 731 423 219 17 29 1807
 (21.5) (40.5) (23.4) (12.1) (0.9) (1.6) (100.0)
Source: Compiled by the author from the TÜSES-Veri Araştırma data set. For the original questions 
(translated into English by the author), see Appendix VII. 
Note: Parentheses are row percentages. 
a Abstentions (n=306) were included here since the declaration of abstention at this stage is an 
explicit expression of the rejection of the incumbent (as well as the opposition). 
b No answers (n=166) and “undecided” responses (n=282).  
 
Probably due to the extraordinary economic conditions of the time, the response data 
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from the survey were not normally distributed but rather positively skewed (to the right). 
In both past and future evaluation data, the median value was not 3 (“No change”) but 2 
(“Worse”). Skewness, however, was stronger for past evaluation (Figure 1) than future 
evaluation (Figure 2). It would be expected that the stronger skewness in the 
distribution for past evaluation would make its explanatory power weaker than that for 
future evaluation, ceteris paribus. Since the great majority of people thought that the 
economy had deteriorated, there was little difference in evaluation of the past. If the 
variation in evaluation is very small, it cannot sufficiently account for variation in the 
dependent variable. Evaluation of the future was more varied and thus potentially better 
able to account for variation in the dependent variable, ceteris paribus. 
 
Figure 1. Voter Evaluation of the Last Twelve Months 
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Source: Compiled by the author from the TÜSES-Veri Araştırma data set.
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Figure 2. Voter Evaluation of the Next Twelve Months 
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Source: Compiled by the author from the TÜSES-Veri Araştırma data set. 
The micro level data also provided evidence supporting the assumption that voters 
held the government responsible for economic performance. The overwhelming 
majority of respondents (91.3 percent, n=1,649) answered that the incumbent was 
responsible for their household economy. Of course, the national economy is more 
directly affected by government policy than is the household economy. Thus, although 
none of the questions asked whether or not the voter held the government responsible 
for the national economy, it seems reasonable that they also assumed that the 
government was accountable for the national economy.   
In the following analysis, separate bivariate logit models were run before 
multivariate logit models were tested. This is because the independent variables were 
significantly cross-correlated (Table 2). The average Pearson r was 0.43 for the six 
cross-correlations. The cross-correlations were particularly high between evaluations of 
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the economy and society (r=0.80 for past evaluations and r=0.88 for future evaluations 
of these two variables). It is thus necessary to first gauge the effect of each independent 
variable at its face value before providing controls for the other variables.  
 
Table 2. Cross-correlation of Independent Variables (N=1,759) 
 
Household 
Past  
Household 
Future 
Economy 
Past 
Economy 
Future 
Society 
Past 
Society 
Future 
Household Past  1      
Household Future 0.4383 1     
Economy Past 0.3682 0.3233 1    
Economy Future 0.2841 0.4829 0.4051 1   
Society Past 0.3614 0.2956 0.8017 0.3606 1  
Society Future 0.2973 0.4539 0.3802 0.8766 0.3935 1
Source: Compiled by the author from the TÜSES-Veri Araştırma data set. 
Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. All were statistically significant at p<0.001. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
This section shows the results of bivariate and multivariate logit models used to analyze 
voter perceptions of economic, social, and political conditions as well as support or 
nonsupport for incumbents. These results support the assumption that voters hold the 
government responsible not only for their personal grievances but also for macro 
performance. 
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Bivariate Logit Models 
 
The results of six separate bivariate logit models are summarized in Table 3 and show 
that all independent variables are significant (p<0.001) predictors of voter punishment 
of the incumbent. For example, the odds ratio of 1.598 for the household economy in 
the past suggests that a unit change in the evaluation scale (such as from one to two) for 
the household economy increased the likelihood of the voter supporting the incumbent 
1.598 times. In other words, if voter A’s evaluation of the household economy in the last 
twelve months was one (“Very Bad”) and voter B’s evaluation was two (“Bad”), then 
voter A’s probability of punishing (not supporting) the incumbent was 1.598 times 
higher than voter B’s.        
 
Table 3. Summary Results of Bivarate Logit Models 
Independent 
Variable 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. Err. z P>|z| N 
Household Past  1.598275 0.160136 4.68 0.001 1,359 
Household Future 1.508120 0.119551 5.18 0.001 1,342 
Economy Past 1.509866 0.139521 4.46 0.001 1,356 
Economy Future 1.515776 0.110855 5.69 0.001 1,348 
Society Past 1.594628 0.145730 5.11 0.001 1,354 
Society Future 1.494938 0.111778 5.38 0.001 1,344 
Source: Calculated and compiled by the author from the TÜSES-Veri Araştırma data set. 
Note: The dependent variable is support for the incumbent, and the independent variable is the voter 
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evaluation of the item in the last twelve or for the next twelve months. 
 
At this stage, if the significant overlap among the six independent variables is 
accepted, it is arguable that evaluations of the household economy, the national 
economy, and sociopolitical conditions, both in the recent past and in the near future, 
affected voter decisions. The odds ratio was particularly high for evaluations of the past 
household economy and sociopolitical conditions. These results indicate that the 
evaluation of the past probably weighed more heavily on voter decisions than 
evaluations of the future. However, the standard error was consistently larger for any 
past evaluation than for any future evaluation. Thus, although the six odds ratios were 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level, past evaluations were slightly less statistically 
significant than future evaluations.  It is possible that the more skewed distributions of 
past evaluations, compared with those of future evaluations, contributed to their larger 
standard errors. The next section provides a more rigorous analysis of the relative 
importance of individual variables by incorporating some or all of them into one 
equation.  
 
Multivariate Logit Models 
 
Which variables are relatively more important than others in determining voter 
decisions? Answers can be found in a preliminary multivariate logit model that 
incorporates all six independent variables (Model 1), and a final multivariate logit 
model (Model 2), that drops the statistically insignificant independent variables using a 
backward selection procedure.  
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Model 1 (Table 4)?shows the effect (odds ratio) of each independent variable when 
the other variables are controlled for. In this model, the effect of cross-correlations or 
superficial relationships is minimized. Results show that perceptions of the household 
economy in the last twelve months are the single most important determinant of voting 
behavior relative to incumbents (p=0.047). This is followed by perceptions of household 
economy in the future (p=0.085). Other potentially important variables are perceptions 
of society and politics in the last twelve months (p=0.106) and the national economy in 
the next twelve months (p=0.136). The other two variables are far below the 
conventionally most lenient 0.10 level of statistical significance. These results indicate 
that voters are more concerned with their own economic conditions than with the 
national economy and sociopolitical conditions when deciding whether or not to support 
the incumbent.  
 
Table 4. Multivariate Logit Model 1: Full Model 
Independent Variable 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Household Past  1.262714 0.148303 1.99 0.047 
Household Future 1.183282 0.115698 1.72 0.085 
Economy Past 0.936174 0.152300 -0.41 0.685 
Economy Future 1.256139 0.192101 1.49 0.136 
Society Past 1.291575 0.204730 1.61 0.106 
Society Future 1.044479 0.160617 0.28 0.777 
Source: Calculated and compiled by the author from the TÜSES-Veri Araştırma data set. 
Note: The dependent variable is support for the incumbent, and the independent variable is voter 
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evaluation of the item in the last twelve or for the next twelve months. 
Number of Obs. = 1331 
LR χ2(6) = 51.14   
Prob > χ2 = 0.001 
Log Likelihood = -554.69618 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0441 
 
Caution should be used in interpreting these results. In particular, the unconditional 
inclusion of all independent variables, some of which are highly cross-correlated, 
substantially reduces the odds ratios of these variables. It may be recalled that 
evaluations of the national economy and society and politics are highly cross-correlated, 
both for the “past” (r=0.80) and for the “future” (r=0.88) (See Table 2). It is thus 
necessary to eliminate from the model one of the two variables that are strongly 
correlated with one another. Removing one of the two variables increases the odds 
ratios of the other variable that has been retained. 
The final model, Model 2 (Table 5), was estimated by eliminating irrelevant 
independent variables using a backward selection procedure while performing the logit 
model. The backward selection procedure, one of three versions for 
independent-variable selection, starts with a full model that contains all independent 
variables. It then removes from the model the independent variable whose partial 
regression coefficient, or partial odds ratio for the logit model, is least significant. It 
repeats this process until the model ends up with only the independent variables that are 
above a given level of statistical significance.  
Using the 0.05 level of significance as the criterion, Model 2 retained three 
independent variables. These included perceptions of the household economy in the last 
twelve months, the national economy in the next twelve months, and sociopolitical 
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conditions in the last twelve months. These three independent variables had stronger 
explanatory power than the three variables removed from the full model. These findings 
are consistent with those obtained in the separate bivariate logit models reported earlier. 
 
Table 5. Multivariate Logit Model 2: Final Model 
Independent Variable Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Household Past 1.338328 0.148611 2.62 0.009 
Economy Future 1.374629 0.110663 3.95 0.001 
Society Past 1.246398 0.130600 2.10 0.036 
Source: Calculated and compiled by the author from the TÜSES-Veri Araştırma data set. 
Note: The dependent variable is support for the incumbent, and the independent variable is voter 
evaluation of the item in the last twelve or for the next twelve months. Independent variables lower 
than the 0.05 level of statistical significance were removed using the backward selection method. 
Number of Obs. = 1331 
LR χ2(3) = 47.94 
Prob > χ2 = 0.001 
Log Likelihood = -556.29588 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0413 
 
Comparisons among these three independent variables do not make sense because 
estimates of parameters are susceptible to the effects of significant cross-correlations. 
The relatively low odds ratio and statistical significance for evaluation of past 
sociopolitical conditions is probably due in part to its relatively high cross-correlations 
with evaluation of past household economy (r=0.3614) and with the evaluation of future 
national economy (r=0.3606). The cross-correlation between evaluation of past 
household economy and future national economy was lower (r=0.2841) than the above 
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two cross-correlations.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Relying on individual survey data, two major issues regarding retrospective voting have 
been addressed in this paper: (1) whether voter decisions are based on household 
economic conditions, national economic conditions, or other sociopolitical conditions, 
and (2) whether or not the future evaluation of the economy affects voting decisions, 
apart from past evaluation. Separate bivariate logit models and the multiple logit models 
both provided consistent answers to these questions. First, evaluation of the household 
economy, the national economy, and society-politics were all important determinants of 
voter support for the incumbent, whether cross-correlation was controlled for or not. 
Second, evaluation of the past was more important than evaluation of the future for the 
household economy and sociopolitical conditions. Evaluation of the future was more 
important than evaluation of the past for the national economy only. 
  These findings revealed important features of retrospective voting that could only be 
analyzed at the individual level. The personal economy and the national economy had 
both independent and common effects on voting decisions. Relatively speaking, voters 
gave due consideration to the personal economy for retrospective voting and the 
national economy for prospective voting. Further, both the economy (personal and 
national) and sociopolitical conditions were influential in deciding whether or not to 
vote for the incumbent. While there were substantial correlations between the evaluation 
of the national economy in the near past or future and evaluations of sociopolitical 
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conditions in the near past or future, each variable nevertheless had a significant 
independent effect on voting decisions.  
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